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Abstract
Based on an analysis of the inference rules used, we provide a characterization of the situations
in which classical provability entails intuitionistic provability. We then examine the relationship
of these derivability notions to uniform provability, a restriction of intuitionistic provability that
embodies a special form of goal-directedness. We determine, rst, the circumstances in which
the former relations imply the latter. Using this result, we identify the richest versions of the so-
called abstract logic programming languages in classical and intuitionistic logic. We then study
the reduction of classical and, derivatively, intuitionistic provability to uniform provability via
the addition to the assumption set of the negation of the formula to be proved. Our focus here
is on understanding the situations in which this reduction is achieved. However, our discussions
indicate the structure of a proof procedure based on the reduction, a matter also considered
explicitly elsewhere. c© 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Classical logic; Intuitionistic logic; Proof theory; Uniform provability; Proof search;
Logic programming
1. Introduction
We address three questions pertaining to derivability relations over sequents in this
paper. The rst of these concerns the correspondence between classical and intuition-
istic provability. It is well known that the former is a stronger relation than the latter:
while every intuitionistic proof is also a classical one, there are some sequents that
are derivable only in classical logic. However, it is possible in principle to obtain the
reverse correspondence by restricting the syntax of formulas considered or the kinds of
inference rules used in a classical proof. We examine this possibility here. In particular,
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we provide a characterization at the level of inference rule usage of the situations in
which classical provability implies intuitionistic provability. Our analysis is \coarse-
grained" in that it pays attention only to the inference rules used, and not to their
interaction in particular proofs as is done in a restricted setting in [21], but it is com-
plete at this level of granularity. While our study is one that has been independently
conducted, results similar to ours have previously been obtained by Orevkov [19] as
we discuss in Section 4. The results that we present have uses in proof search. One
possible application is that it permits intuitionistic proof procedures to be employed
in settling questions of classical validity in special situations. This approach has ben-
ets and has also been employed in the past: for example, it underlies the procedure
commonly used relative to Horn clause logic with the virtue that proof search at any
point is driven by a single goal formula. Another application of our observations is
that it supports the use of classical principles in intuitionistic proof search. Thus, the
treatment of quantier dependencies can, in special circumstances, be achieved by a
static (dual) Skolemization process instead of a costly dynamic accounting mechanism.
The second question we consider concerns the correspondence between classical and
intuitionistic provability on the one hand and uniform provability on the other. Uniform
proofs as identied in [14] are intuitionistic proofs restricted so as to capture a goal-
directedness in proof search. One reason for interest in this category of proofs is that it
provides a framework for interpreting the logical symbols in the formulas being proved
as primitives for directing search and the inference rules pertaining to these symbols
as specications of their search semantics. This viewpoint has been exploited in [14]
in describing a proof-theoretic foundation for logic programming. By its very deni-
tion, uniform provability is a less inclusive relation than either classical or intuitionistic
provability. However, by a suitable restriction of the context, it is possible to obtain
a correspondence between these three relations. We provide, once again, a complete
characterization at the level of inference rule usage of the situations in which intu-
itionistic provability entails and uniform provability. When combined with the earlier
result, this analysis yields a similar characterization relative to classical logic. As one
application of these observations, they enable us to identify the richest possible logic
programming languages within classical and intuitionistic logic; our remarks relative to
intuitionistic logic are similar to those in [8].
The nal question we consider concerns the reduction of classical and intuitionistic
provability to uniform provability. Ecient procedures can be designed for searching
for uniform proofs. Towards exploiting this possibility, it is worth considering a modi-
cation of the given formula or sequent in a way that does not alter the original deriv-
ability question but, nevertheless, succeeds in reducing it to one of uniform provability.
One such modication that has been studied in the past is the addition of the negation
of the formula that is to be proved to the assumptions [18, 17]. This transformation is
sound with respect to classical logic. We characterize the situations in which it also
achieves the desired reduction. Since the transformation can be applied to intuitionis-
tic provability without loss of soundness whenever this notion coincides with classical
provability, we obtain information indirectly about the reducibility in this case as well.
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2. Logical preliminaries
We will work within the framework of a rst-order logic in this paper. The logical
symbols that we assume as primitive are >, ?, ^, _, , 9, and 8. The rst two
symbols in this collection denote the tautologous and the contradictory propositions,
respectively. Note that we consider these logical constants to be distinct from atomic
formulas. Negation is a dened notion in our language, :A being an abbreviation for
(A?).
Notions of derivation that are of interest to us are formalized by sequent calculi. A
sequent in our context is a pair of multisets of formulas. Assuming that   and  are
its elements, the pair is written as  ! and   and  are referred to as its antecedent
and succedent, respectively. Such a sequent is an axiom if either >2 or for some A
that is either ? or an atomic formula, it is the case that A2  and A2. The rules
that may be used in constructing sequent proofs are those that can be obtained from
the schemata shown in Fig. 1.
In these schemata,  ,  and  stand for multisets of formulas, B and D stand for
formulas, c stands for a constant, x stands for a variable and t stands for a term.
The notation B;   (; B) is used here for a multiset containing the formula B whose
remaining elements form the multiset   (respectively, ). Further, expressions of the
form [t=x]B are used to denote the result of replacing all free occurrences of x in B
by t, with bound variables being renamed as needed to ensure the logical correctness
of these replacements. There is the usual proviso with respect to the rules produced
from the schemata 9-L and 8-R: the constant that replaces c should not appear in the
formulas that form the lower sequent. A contraction rule is one that is obtained from
either the contr-L or the contr-R schema. All other rules are referred to as operational
rules and the formula in the lower sequent that is explicitly aected by such a rule
is called its principal formula. Finally, we refer to contr-L and the operational rules
whose principal formulas are in the antecedent of the lower sequent as left rules and
to the remaining rules as right rules.
We are interested in three notions of derivability for sequents of the form  !.
A C-proof for such a sequent is a derivation obtained by making arbitrary uses of the
inference rules. I-proofs are C-proofs in which every sequent has exactly one formula in
its succedent. Notice that, by this stipulation,  must itself consist of a single formula.
Finally, a uniform proof or O-proof is an I-proof in which any sequent that has a
non-atomic formula distinct from ? in its succedent occurs only as the lower sequent
of an inference rule that introduces the top-level logical symbol of that formula.
In the case that  is a single formula, we shall write   C` ,   I`  and   O`  to
indicate the existence of, respectively, a C-proof, an I-proof and an O-proof for  !.
The rst two notions correspond to classical and intuitionistic provability respectively.
The sequent calculi that we have used here to characterize these derivability relations
are transparently related to those in [20]: we have treated antecedents and succedents
as multisets rather than sets but have added the contraction rules to realize arbitrary
multiplicity of formulas and, in the intuitionistic setting, we do not permit sequents
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B; B;  !
contr-LB;  !
 !; B; B
contr-R !; B
 !;? ?-R !;D
B;  ! ^-LB ^ D; !
D; ! ^-LB ^ D; !
B;  ! D; ! _-LB _ D; !
 !; B  !;D ^-R !; B ^ D
 !; B _-R !; B _ D
 !;D _-R !; B _ D
 !; B D;  ! -LBD; !;
B;  !;D -R !; BD
[t=x]B;  ! 8-L8x B;  !
 !; [t=x]B 9-R !; 9x B
[c=x]B;  ! 9-L9x B;  !
 !; [c=x]B 8-R !; 8x B
Fig. 1. Rules for deriving sequents.
of the form  ! that are not derivable in the system of [20]. Uniform provability
corresponds to the existence of an O-proof. This notion indicates the possibility for
a goal-directedness in the search for a derivation, with the top-level structure of the
formula in the succedent controlling the next step in the search at each stage.
We observe certain properties of our derivation calculi for classical and intuitionistic
logic that will be used in later sections. First, any sequent in which the antecedent and
succedent have a common formula has a C-proof and, if the succedent has a single
element, an I-proof. Thus, a modication to our calculi that considers all such sequents
to be axioms does not change the set of provable sequents. The second observation
concerns the so-called Cut inference rules that are obtained from the schemata
 1!1; B B;  2!2
 1;  2!1; 2
Notice that in generating Cut rules in the intuitionistic context, 1 must be instantiated
by an empty multiset and 2 by a singleton multiset. Now, these Cut rules are ad-
missible with respect to classical and intuitionistic provability as formulated here, i.e.,
the same set of sequents have C-proofs and I-proofs even if we allow these additional
rules to be used in derivations. This property can be demonstrated by describing a
procedure for eliminating occurrences of the Cut rules from any given derivation. An
examination of a typical such procedure { for example, the procedure contained in [6]
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{ actually allows a stronger conclusion to be drawn: a derivation that uses Cut rules,
contraction rules and operational inference rules obtained from a restricted subset of
the schemata in Fig. 1 can be transformed into one in which only contraction rules and
operational rules obtainable from the restricted schemata set appear. Furthermore, this
property holds even when the notion of an axiom is strengthened as described earlier
in this paragraph.
3. Building contraction into other inference rules
The contraction rules allow for a proigate multiplicity of formulas. The necessary
multiplicity can be characterized more precisely by identifying derived forms of some
of the operational rules that incorporate contraction into their structure and thereby
permit the contraction rules themselves to be omitted from the calculus. We describe
below a convenient form of these derived rules that is presented, for instance, in [2].
We consider rst the case for classical provability. The new rules that are of interest
are those obtained from the following schemata:
A; B;  !
^-LA ^ B;  !
 !; A; B
_-R !; A _ B
 !B;  D;  !
-LBD; !
8x P; [t=x]P;  !
8-L8x P;  !
 !; 9xP; [t=x]P
9-R !; 9xP
These rules are obviously derived ones: a C-proof of the lower sequent of each rule
can be obtained from C-proof(s) of the upper sequent(s) by using an instance of the
‘asterisk-less’ version of the schema followed by some number of contraction rules.
By a C+-proof let us mean a derivation constructed in a calculus obtained from the
one for C-proofs by replacing the rules ^-L, _-R, -L, 8-L and 9-R with the ones
obtained from the schemata above. It is then easily seen that a sequent has a C-proof
if and only if it has a C+-proof.
Let an C-proof be a C+-proof in which contraction rules are not used. Our objective
is to show that a sequent has a C-proof whenever it has a C+-proof, i.e., contraction
can be eliminated from C-proofs under the described strengthening of the ^-L, _-R,
-L, 8-L and 9-R rules. This can be done through the following sequence of steps
that culminate in Theorem 3.
Lemma 1. Let  ! have a C-proof of height h and let all references to rules be
to ones for constructing C-proofs.
1. For any single upper sequent rule of the form
 0!0
 !
it is the case that  0!0 has a C-proof of height at most h.
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2. For any rule with two upper sequents of the form
 0!0  00!00
 !
it is the case that both  0!0 and  00!00 have C-proofs of height at most h.
Proof. The cases for 8-L and 9-R follow from observing that if a C-proof exists
for a certain sequent, then there is a derivation of similar structure and identical height
for any sequent obtained from it by adding formulas to the antecedent or succedent.
The remaining cases, that show the invertibility of all the other rules, are covered by
the Inversion Lemma of [23].
Let  be a multiset of formulas. We use the notation ^ to denote the set of formulas
appearing in .
Lemma 2. Let  ! have a C-proof of height h and let  0 and 0 be such that
 ^  ^0 and ^ ^0. Then  0!0 has a C-proof of height at most h.
Proof. By an induction on the height of the derivation for  !. We leave the reader
to ll out the details, perhaps by consulting [23].
Theorem 3. A sequent  ! has a C-proof if and only if it has a C-proof.
Proof. It suces to show that  ! has a C+-proof if and only if it has a C-proof.
The ‘if’ direction is obvious. For the other direction we use an induction on the number
of contractions in the C+-proof. If there are none, then we already have a C-proof.
Otherwise, we nd a contraction that is the rst one in the derivation in the path from
an axiom to the nal sequent. By Lemma 2, this contraction can be dispensed with,
yielding a C+-proof with one less contraction.
Theorem 3 and Lemma 1 provide the basis for a proof procedure for classical logic
that is worth noting. All the rules that may be used in C-proofs that are distinct from
the 8-L and 9-R rules have an upper sequent or two upper sequents with fewer logical
symbols than those in the lower sequent. We may therefore use these rules repeatedly
in a terminating process to reduce a given sequent to a new set of sequents for which
derivations must be constructed. If every sequent in the set so produced is an axiom,
then we will have established classical provability. If at least one of the new sequents
is not an axiom and cannot be the lower sequent of either a 8-L or a 9-R, then the
original sequent can have no C-proof. Otherwise each non-axiom sequent is reduced
by a simultaneous use of all the 8-L and 9-R rules that are applicable to it and the
process is repeated. The procedure as presently stated is not quite practical since the use
of a 8-L or a 9-R rule also involves picking the ‘right’ instantiation term. However,
this choice can be delayed by introducing instead a variable that may be instantiated
later and determining bindings for such variables by using unication when checking
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if a sequent is an axiom. Unication must, of course, not lead to the constraint on
constants in the 9-L and 8-R rules to be violated. The best way to achieve this eect
in the classical setting is to transform the original sequent by a process referred to as
Herbrandization in [22] that eliminates at the outset all quantiers that might require
a 9-L and 8-R to be used in proof search.
Contraction is applicable only to antecedent formulas in the intuitionistic setting. The
essential uses of these rules occur in conjunction with the ^-L, 8-L, and -L rules.
To realize the eects of these uses, we may replace the ^-L and the 8-L schemata by
^-L and 8-L respectively, and -L by the following:
BD; !B D;  ! -LIBD; !
Notice that, in contrast to the situation in classical logic, the present modication to
the -L rules incorporates a contraction in the antecedent.
We refer to a derivation constructed in the calculus for I-proofs with the indicated
replacements for the ^-L, 8-L and -L rules as an I+-proof. If contr-L is not used in
such a derivation, we shall call it an I-proof. The adequacy of I-proofs in settling
questions of intuitionistic provability is stated in the following theorem whose proof
may be modelled on the arguments in [23].
Theorem 4. A sequent  !F has a I-proof if and only if it has a I-proof.
Once again, Theorem 4 has content that can be utilized in structuring proof search
in intuitionistic logic. However, there are important dierences from the classical case.
First, the static Herbrandization step is not sound in the new setting [16, 22]. An
alternative approach that can be used in this case is to treat the 9-L and 8-R rules
explicitly in proof search and to employ a dynamic form of Herbrandization to ensure
that the required constraints are satised by quantier instantiation terms [4, 16, 22].
Second, a detailed analysis reveals that the process for reducing sequents must delay
consideration of the rules -LI , _-R and 9-R in addition to 8-L. 2 Further, the
order in which these rules are eventually considered may be important and it may be
necessary to backtrack over particular orders of reduction.
4. Correspondence between classical and intuitionistic provability
It is clear from the denitions that, if   is a (multi)set of formulas and  is a single
formula, then   I`  implies   C` . The converse is not always true. A ‘canonical’
2 There is actually another problem with regard to the -LI rules: the principal formula of this rule appears
again in the left upper sequent and so it is not certain that a use of the rule will produce less ‘complex’
sequents. Dyckho [3] and Hudelmaier [9] have proposed alternative sequent calculi for propositional logic
that overcomes this problem but, to our knowledge, no similar calculus has been described for the situation
where quantiers are included.
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demonstration of this fact is obtained by taking   to be the empty (multi)set and
letting  consist of the formula ((q s) q) q. However, the truth of the converse
and, hence, the equivalence of classical and intuitionistic provability, can be assured
when the syntax of the assumption and conclusion formulas is restricted in certain
ways. We describe these syntactic restrictions in this section. Our characterization is
based, rst of all, on the inference rules used in a C-proof and is a complete one at
this level: we identify four classes of C-proofs determined by the non-use of certain
inference rules and show that (a) an I-proof exists for the nal sequent of a C-proof
belonging to any of these classes and (b) for each possible way for violating all
the restrictions on inference rule usage, there is a C-proof with a corresponding nal
sequent for which no I-proof exists. Now, the syntactic structure of the formulas in a
given sequent determines the inference rules that can appear in a (cut-free) C-proof of
that sequent. This observation enables us to translate the restriction on inference rules
into the desired syntactic constraints on formulas.
The following theorem identies one of the classes of C-proofs that are of interest.
Theorem 5. Let  ! have a C-proof in which no -R or _-L rule is used. Then,
for some G in ; it is the case that  !G has an I-proof. In particular; if  consists
of a single formula; then  ! itself has an I-proof.
Proof. We use an induction on the heights of C-proofs. If  ! is an axiom, then,
clearly, there is a G in  such that  !G is also an axiom. Thus, the theorem is true
for C-proofs of height 1. If the height of the derivation is greater than 1, we consider
each possibility for the last rule used. If this is a rule with a single upper sequent,
then, by assumption, it must be distinct from an -R. In all the remaining cases, the
induction hypothesis combined possibly with a rule obtained from the same schema
yields the desired conclusion. If the last rule has two upper sequents, then, since it is
distinct from an _-L, it must be either an -L or an ^-R. Suppose it is the rst. Then
the derivation at the end has the structure
 0!1; B D;  0!2
BD; 0!1; 2;
where   is BD; 0 and 1 and 2 constitute a (multiset) partition of . By hypoth-
esis, either  0!G has an I-proof for some G in 1 or  0!B has an I-proof. In
the rst case, it is easily seen that BD; 0!G also has an I-proof. In the second
case, we use the hypothesis again to observe that for some G in 2 it is the case that
D; 0!G has an I-proof. These observations used together with an -L rule yields
the theorem in this case. A similar argument can be provided when the last rule is an
^-R.
We translate the restriction on proof rules in Theorem 5 into restrictions on the
syntax of formulas. Consider the classes of formulas dened by the following mutually
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recursive syntax rules, assuming A represents atomic formulas:
G ::= > j? jA jG ^ G jG _ G j 8x G j 9x G
D ::= > j? jA jGD jD ^ D j 9x D j 8x D
A sequent in which the succedent consists of a G-formula and the antecedent contains
only D-formulas is classically provable just in case it is intuitionistically provable. We
observe that the G- and D-formulas dened here subsume the so-called goal formulas
and program clauses of Horn clause logic [14].
There is an auxiliary utility to Theorem 5: it has content relevant to dening a multi-
formula succedent sequent calculus for intuitionistic logic. Such a calculus is of interest
because it permits a postponement in proof search of decisions about which disjunct
of a disjunctive formula in the succedent is to be chosen. Consider the calculus for
constructing C-proofs with the _-L and -R rules replaced, respectively, with ones
obtained from the following schemata:
B;  !F D;  !F
B_D;  !; F
B;  !D
 !; BD
A sequent of the form  ! in which  is a singleton multiset has a derivation in this
calculus if and only if it has an I-proof; the ‘if ’ direction is obvious and the ‘only if’
direction follows from Theorem 5 and an easy induction on the number of occurrences
of the ‘new’ _-L and -R rules in the given C-proof. We may also allow  to
contain more than one formula by interpreting it as the disjunction of these formulas.
We note, however, that the modication to the _-L schema is essential even under
such an interpretation for quanticational logic: without this modication, the sequent
8x (p(x)_ q)! (8x p(x))_ q would, for example, have a derivation even though it has
no I-proof.
The following theorem identies a second interesting class of C-proofs.
Theorem 6. Let   be a multiset of formulas and let B1; : : : ; Bn be formulas such that
 !B1; : : : ; Bn has a C-proof in which no -R or 8-R rule is used. Then the sequent
 !B1 _    _Bn has an I-proof. In the case that n=1;  !B1 has an I-proof.
Proof. This theorem can be proved, once again, by an induction on the heights of
C-proofs. We do not provide an explicit proof here, noting only that an argument
that is similar to, but simpler than, that for Theorem 7 below suces. In particular,
a complication arises in the (inductive) proof of Theorem 7 from having to consider
a 8-R as the last rule in the C-proof of  !B1; : : : ; Bn. The premise of the present
theorem rules out this possibility. There is an additional case that has to be considered
here in that a 8-L rule could be the last one used. However, the argument for this case
is a relatively simple one.
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Following earlier lines, we can rephrase Theorem 6 in terms of a restriction on the
syntax of formulas. Consider the following classes of formulas, assuming, again, that
A represents atomic formulas:
G ::=> j? jA jG ^G jG _G j 9x G
D ::=> j? jA jGD jD^D jD_D j 9x D j 8x D:
If   is a (multi)set of D-formulas and F is a G-formula, then   C` F only if   I` F .
The classes of G- and D-formulas described by the present rules constitute a general-
ization of similarly named classes in [18] and have been studied there as the basis for
disjunctive logic programming [11].
Analogously to Theorem 5, Theorem 6 can be used to justify a multi-formula succe-
dent sequent calculus for intuitionistic logic. Consider the calculus for constructing
C-proofs with the 8-R and -R rules replaced, respectively, with ones obtained from
the following schemata:
 ! [c=x]B
 !; 8x B
B;  !D
 !; BD
A sequent of the form  ! in which  is a singleton multiset has a derivation in this
calculus if and only if it has an I-proof. As before, we may also allow  to contain
more than one formula by interpreting it as the disjunction of these formulas. We note
that the calculus that is so described for intuitionistic logic diers supercially { in
particular, only in the manner in which the logical constant ? is treated { from the
GHPC calculus of Dragalin [2].
A third category of C-proofs is identied in the following theorem.
Theorem 7. Let   be a multiset of formulas and let B1; : : : ; Bn be formulas such that
 !B1; : : : ; Bn has a C-proof in which no -R or 8-L rule is used. Then the sequent
 !B1 _    _Bn has an I-proof. In the case that n=1;  !B1 has an I-proof.
Proof. It is convenient to prove the theorem assuming derivation calculi with the
stronger notion of axioms described in Section 2, i.e., ones in which any sequent whose
antecedent and succedent have a common formula is considered an axiom. Further, we
show a stronger property than that required: If  !B1; : : : ; Bn has a C-proof in which
no -R or 8-L rule is used, then  !B1 _    _Bn has an I-proof in which no 8-L
rule is used. We prove this property by means of an induction on the height of the
C-proof for  !B1; : : : ; Bn.
The base case corresponds to  !B1; : : : ; Bn being an axiom. In this case, we can
construct an I-proof of  !B1 _    _Bn by using a sequence of _-R rules below a
suitably chosen axiom. Note that no 8-L rule appears in this derivation.
For the inductive step, we consider the various possibilities for the last rule used in
the derivation. The argument is straightforward for all permitted left rules, i.e., ones
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that are distinct from 8-L, in which the succedent is identical in the upper and lower
sequents { we invoke the induction hypothesis and use an instance of the same rule
schema to get an I-proof for  !B1 _    _Bn, and we note that this derivation must
not contain a 8-L rule occurrence.
The only remaining possibility for a left rule is that it is an -L. In this case, the
derivation at the end has the structure
 0!1; F D;  0!2
F D;  0!1; 2
where   is F D; 0 and 1 and 2 constitute some partition of B1; : : : ; Bn. The argu-
ment follows the pattern of that for the other left rules in the case that 1 is empty.
We therefore assume that it is nonempty. We also assume that the nal sequent in
the derivation has exactly two formulas in the succedent and that 1 is B1 and 2 is
B2; these assumptions are not critical, and may be dispensed with in a more detailed
argument.
Now, using the induction hypothesis, we see that  0!B1 _F and D; 0!B2 have
I-proofs in which no 8-L rule is used. From this it follows that F D;  0!B1 _F
and F;D;  0!B2 also have such I-proofs. Using the latter, we can construct an I-proof
for B1 _F; F D;  0!B1 _B2 as follows:
B1; F D;  0!B1 _-R
B1; F D;  0!B1 _B2
F;  0!F
F;D;  0!B2 _-R
F;D;  0!B1 _B2 -L
F; F D;  0!B1 _B2 _-L
B1 _F; F D;  0!B1 _B2
Notice that no 8-L rule appears in this derivation. We can combine this derivation with
the one for F D;  0!B1 _F by means of a Cut rule and some contr-L rules to get
a derivation for F D;  0!B1 _B2. Finally, by the observation in Section 2, the Cut
rule can be eliminated from this derivation to obtain an I-proof for F D;  0!B1 _B2
in which no 8-L rules appear.
To complete the proof, we have to consider the possibility that the last rule in the
C-proof is a right rule. Suppose that it is, in fact, a 9-R. Then the derivation at the end
has the following form:
 !B1; : : : ; Bi−1; [t=x]B0i ; : : : ; Bn
 !B1; : : : ; Bi−1; 9x B0i ; : : : ; Bn:
We have assumed here that Bi is actually a formula of the form 9x B0i . By the induction
hypothesis,  !B1 _    _Bi−1 _ [t=x]B0i _    _Bn has an I-proof. Now, it is easily seen
that
B1 _    _Bi−1 _ [t=x]Bi _    _Bn!B1 _    _Bi−1 _9x B0i _    _Bn
has an I-proof in which no 8-L rule is used. The desired conclusion follows in this
case rst from using a Cut rule and then noting that this rule can be eliminated from
the derivation without introducing any occurrences of the 8-L rule.
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An argument similar to that for 9-R can be provided for all other permitted right
rules except 8-R. For the case of 8-R, we need a further observation: If a sequent
of the form  !P1 _    _ [c=x]P0i _    _Pn has an I-proof in which no 8-L rule is
used and if   and P1; : : : ; P0i ; : : : ; Pn are such that the constant c does not appear in
them, then  !P1 _    _ 8x P0i _    _Pn has an I-proof in which no 8-L rule is used.
This observation can be established by a routine induction on the height of the given
I-proof. Further, it can be used together with the present induction hypothesis to yield
an argument for the only remaining case in the proof of the main claim.
We can, as usual, rephrase Theorem 7 in terms of a restriction on the syntax of
formulas. Once again, consider the following classes of formulas, assuming that A
represents atomic formulas:
G ::=> j? jA jG ^G jG _G j 9x G j 8x G
D ::=> j? jA jGD jD^D jD_D j 9x D:
If   is a (multi)set of D-formulas and F is a G-formula, then   C` F only if   I` F .
The following theorem identies a fourth, and nal, class of C-proofs that are of
interest from the perspective of this section.
Theorem 8. Let   be a multiset of formulas and let B be a formula such that  !B
has a C-proof in which no -L; _-R or 9-R rule is used. Then  !B has an I-proof.
Proof. We claim that if  !B has a C-proof in which no -L, _-R or 9-R rule is
used, then this sequent also has a C-proof in which no -L, _-R or 9-R rule is
used. Towards seeing this, we rst make the easy observation that, under the given
assumption,  !B must have a C+-proof in which the latter rules do not appear.
Now, it is easily determined that the C-proofs mentioned in Lemmas 1 and 2 may be
qualied to be ones in which the -L, _-R and 9-R rules do not appear. Finally,
an argument similar to that provided for Theorem 3 allows us to conclude that  !B
has a C-proof that does not contain any -L, _-R or 9-R rules.
The claim easily yields the theorem: Every sequent in the C-proof of restricted
form must have exactly one formula in the succedent. Each occurrence of an ^-L
and 8-L rule in this derivation can be eliminated in favor of a contr-L rule paired with
some number of ^-L and 8-L rules, respectively, to produce a C-proof. The number
of formulas in the succedent of each sequent remains unchanged by this transformation
and so the C-proof that is produced is also an I-proof.
Towards rephrasing Theorem 8 in terms of a restriction on formulas, we dene the
following classes of formulas, assuming, as usual, that A represents atomic formulas:
G ::=> j? jA jG ^G jDG j 8x G
D ::=> j? jA jD^D jD_D j 9x D j 8x D:
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It follows from the theorem that if   is a (multi)set of D-formulas and F is
a G-formula, then   C` F only if   I` F .
Theorem 9. Theorems 5{8 provide a characterization at the level of proof rules of
the conditions under which classical provability implies intuitionistic provability that
is complete in the following sense: for each way of violating all the restrictions on
inference rule usage described in the mentioned theorems; there is a sequent with a
singleton succedent that has a violating C-proof but no I-proof.
Proof. C-proofs may be categorized into those that do and those that do not contain
occurrences of the -R rules.
We consider rst the collection of C-proofs in which the -R rules are not used.
To violate the restrictions on proof rule usage contained in Theorems 5{8, a derivation
of this kind must contain at least one occurrence of an _-L, a 8-R and a 8-L rule and
of either an -L, an _-R or a 9-R rule. We list sequents below that have C-proofs
satisfying each of these requirements and note that none of these has an I-proof:
(8x p(x)) q; 8x (p(x)_ q)! q
8x (p(x)_ q)! (8x p(x))_ q
8x 8y (r(x; a)_ r(y; b))!9y 8x r(x; y):
We assume in these sequents that q is a proposition symbol, p is a unary predicate
symbol, r is a binary predicate symbol and a and b are constants.
A C-proof in which an -R rule is used must also contain an occurrence of
one of the -L, _-R and 9-R rules in order to violate the restrictions described in
Theorems 5{8. The following sequents have C-proofs satisfying each of these require-
ments:
(q s) q! q
! q_ (q s)
!9x (p(x)p(f(x)))
In these sequents, we assume additionally that s is a proposition symbol and that f is
a unary function symbol. It is easily seen that none of these sequents has an I-proof,
thus verifying the theorem even in this case.
We stress, once again, the observation made in Section 1 that our analysis of the
correspondence between classical and intuitionistic provability is coarse-grained in that
it pays attention only to the rules used in a derivation and not to the particular inter-
actions between rules in it. Thus, there are sequents whose only C-proofs violate all
the conditions in Theorems 5{8 but which, nevertheless, have I-proofs. For example,
consider the sequent
! ((8x (r(x; a)_ r(x; b))) ((((8x 9y r(x; y)) q) q)_ s))
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in which we have used the non-logical vocabulary described in the proof of Theorem 9.
Any C-proof of this sequent must use an _-L, an -R, a 8-R, a 8-L, an _-R, a 9-R
and an -L rule. However, this sequent has an I-proof. We note that it is possible to
conduct an alternative analysis of the correspondence between classical and intuitionistic
provability that focuses specically on the interactions between the rules that appear in
a derivation. Such a study has, for instance, been carried out in [21] for a propositional
logic that has , ^ and : as its only logical symbols. An analysis of this sort indicates
when a given classical derivation may be interpreted as having intuitionistic force and
may be used in driving a search for a C-proof with such a force given one without
it. The results of this section are relevant to such a study in that they provide insight
into the rules between which interactions should be considered carefully.
After the completion of this paper, it has come to our attention that a study similar
to the one presented in this section has previously been conducted by Orevkov [19].
In this work, the notion of a -class is identied as a list of logical symbols with
positive or negative markings. A sequent is said to belong to a given -class if a
logical symbol occurs positively (negatively) in the sequent only if it does not occur
with a corresponding positive (negative) marking in the listing denoting the -class.
Viewed dierently, a -class describes a restriction to the syntax of formulas that are
permitted to appear in sequents. A completely Glivenko class is now dened to be
a -class such that any sequent with a singleton succedent belonging to that class is
derivable in classical predicate logic only if it is also derivable in intuitionistic predicate
logic. 3 Analogous to our Theorem 9, Orevkov provides a complete description of
all completely Glivenko classes. The two characterizations are not exactly identical
because negation is treated in [19] as a primitive symbol. However, a comparison of
the results can still be made. Ignoring the negation symbol, the two characterizations
coincide. Treating the negation symbol explicitly allows for distinctions in [19] that, in
our context, would translate not into restrictions in rule usage, but into distinguishing
dierent roles for implication and paying attention to the polarity of occurrences of ?.
5. Relationship to uniform provability
We consider now the relationship between classical and intuitionistic provability on
the one hand and uniform provability on the other. Our analysis covers two kinds
of questions. First, we examine restrictions in the syntax of formulas that ensure a
coextensiveness between these dierent proof relations. Following this, we consider
the reduction of classical provability to uniform provability in situations where these
relations are not coextensive.
3 In reality, it is predicate logic with equality that is considered in [19], but this appears not to be
signicant to the analysis.
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5.1. Correspondence with uniform provability
Our rst goal is to describe the sequents for which the existence of an I-proof implies
the existence of an O-proof. Since an O-proof is a special case of an I-proof, we can
combine this characterization with the results of the previous section to obtain a similar
relationship between classical and uniform provability. The following theorem provides
the desired characterization in terms of the inference rules used in the I-proof.
Theorem 10. Let   be a multiset of formulas and let G be a formula. If the sequent
 !G has an I-proof in which
1. either no _-L rule is used or no _-R and no 9-R rules are used; and
2. either no 9-L rule or no 9-R rule is used;
then it also has a uniform proof. Moreover; this characterization is tight in that; for
each possible way of violating these restrictions; there is a sequent with an I-proof
but no uniform proof.
Proof. The rst part of the theorem is an immediate consequence of the permutability
properties of inference rules in intuitionistic sequent calculi established, for instance,
in [10]. To complete the proof of the theorem, we list a suitable set of sequents:
p(a)_p(b)!9x p(x);
q_ s! s_ q; and
9x (p(x)^ q)!9x p(x):
We assume here that q and s are proposition symbols, p is a predicate symbol and a
and b are constants. None of these sequents has a uniform proof. However all of them
have I-proofs: the rst has one in which an _-L and a 9-R rule are used, the second
has one in which an _-L and an _-R rule are used and the last has one in which a
9-L and a 9-R rule are used.
The notion of uniform provability is useful in identifying logical languages that
provide a basis for programming [14]. In particular, letting D and G denote collections
of formulas and ` denote a chosen proof relation, an abstract logic programming
language is dened to be a triple hD;G;`i such that, for all nite subsets P of D
and all G 2G, P`G if and only if P O` G. In the programming interpretation of
such a triple, elements of D function as program clauses and elements of G serve as
queries or goals. The virtue of this denition is that it supports a broad interpretation
of logic programming based on a duality in the meaning of logical symbols: on the
one hand, these symbols have a declarative reading given by the proof relation ` and,
on the other, they are accorded a search-related interpretation given by the rules for
introducing each of them on the right in sequent proofs.
An interesting question is that of how rich the syntax of program clauses and goals
can be in the cases where ` is interpreted as classical or intuitionistic provability.
Before answering this question, we note that these formulas must contain certain syn-
tactic components in order to be useful for programming: the procedural interpretation
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of program clauses relies on universal quantication and implications being permitted
at the top-level in these formulas and outermost existential quantication is important
in goals in making sense of the result of nding a derivation. In light of Theorem 10,
the second requirement precludes outermost occurrences of disjunction and existential
quantication in program clauses. Thus, if ` is interpreted as intuitionistic provability,
the collection of G- and D-formulas given by the following syntax rules represent the
largest possible classes for goals and program clauses:
G ::=> j? jA jG ^G jG _G jDG j 8x G j 9x G
D ::=> j? jA jGD jD^D j j 8x D
We assume, as before, that A represents atomic formulas in these rules. The only
essential dierence between the abstract logic programming language given by these
classes of formulas and intuitionistic provability and the language of hereditary Harrop
formulas studied in [14] is that the logical constant ? is permitted to appear here in
goals and program clauses.
In the case that classical provability is used instead to clarify the declarative se-
mantics, further restrictions have to be placed on formulas to ensure coextensiveness
with intuitionistic provability, a prelude to coextensiveness with uniform provability.
By virtue of Theorem 5, one way to achieve this eect is to exclude the case involving
implication from the syntax rule for G-formulas above. The language that results from
this restriction is closely related to the Horn clause logic that underlies the language
Prolog: in particular, it extends Horn clause logic as presented in [14] by including
universal quantication in goals and allowing ? to appear in goals and program clauses.
However, it is not necessary to exclude implications in goals even when the cho-
sen proof relation is classical provability. 4 What the examples used in the proof of
Theorem 9 show is that implications must not appear negatively in program clauses
or embedded within disjunctions or existential quantications in goals. We can modify
the denition of G- and D-formulas as follows to satisfy these requirements:
G ::=G0 jDG jG ^G j 8x G
G0 ::=> j? jA jG0 ^G0 jG0 _G0 j 8x G0 j 9x G0
D ::=> j? jA jG0D jD^D j j 8x D
Using Theorems 5 and 10 and the easy observations that (a)  !F1 ^F2 has a C-proof
only if  !F1 and  !F2 also have C-proofs, (b)  !F1F2 has a C-proof only if
F1;  !F2 also has one, and (c)  !8x F has a C-proof only if, for some constant c
not appearing in   or F ,  ! [c=x]F also has one, it can be seen that these denitions
in fact yield an abstract logic programming language. Moreover, this is the largest
4 This is not in contradiction to Theorem 9. As noted already, the analysis in the theorem does not pay
attention to the order in which rules are used and so is not ne-grained enough to provide a tight constraint
on the syntax of formulas.
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such language based on classical logic that also meets the mentioned requirements for
programming.
5.2. Reduction to uniform provability
The succedent formula can be used to direct the search for a uniform proof for a
sequent in a fairly deterministic fashion. By exploiting this fact, it is possible to dene
ecient proof procedures for logical languages that have a derivability relation that
is coextensive with uniform provability. This idea has been used previously relative
to abstract logic programming languages; see, for instance, [13, 16]. Now, even in
situations where the proof relation of interest deviates from uniform provability, it may
still be possible to utilize the latter notion in structuring proof search. For instance, it
may be possible to modify the sequent whose derivability status is to be veried in
some predetermined and sound way to produce a new sequent that has a derivation
in the relevant sense just in case it has an O-proof. One approach of this kind that
has been considered in the past in conjunction with classical logic [18, 17]. In this
approach, the attempt to prove a sequent of the form  !F is transformed into an
attempt to prove F ?;  !F instead. As we see below, the indicated augmentation
of the antecedent can be made implicit by being built into new inference rules. The
virtue of the resulting derivation system is that it provides the basis for a goal-directed
proof procedure with the characteristic that the attempt to prove the original goal is
restarted with a modied set of premises at certain points in the search [5, 7, 12, 17].
A crucial requirement in using this method is that the described augmentation of
the sequent reduce the question of classical provability to that of uniform provability.
Towards understanding the applicability of this method, we wish to circumscribe the
sequents for which this reduction is actually achieved. We begin by observing that the
overall approach is actually sound:
Lemma 11. Let   be a multiset of formulas and let F be a formula. Then F ?;
  C` F if and only if   C` F .
Proof. This follows easily from the admissibility of the Cut inference rules and the
fact that ! (F ?)_F has a C-proof.
Since O-proofs are I-proofs of a special form, a useful rst step towards the de-
sired characterization is to understand when the augmentation of a sequent succeeds in
reducing classical provability to intuitionistic provability.
Theorem 12. Let   be a multiset of formulas and let F be a formula such that
 !F has a C-proof. Then there is an I-proof for F ?;  !F if any one of the
following conditions holds relative to the C-proof of  !F :
1. no 8-R rule is used;
2. no -R and no _-L rule is used;
3. no -R and no 8-L rule is used; and
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4. no -L; _-R and 9-R rule is used.
Further; for each way of violating all these conditions; there is a sequent  !F with
a violating C-proof such that F ?;  !F does not have an I-proof.
Proof. Using the results in [15], it can be established that  !F has a C-proof in
which no 8-R rule is used, then F ?;  !F has an I-proof. This fact is also inde-
pendently and explicitly established in [17]. Further, it is obvious that F ?;  !F
has an I-proof if  !F has one. If any one of conditions 2{4 is true, then, by virtue of
Theorems 5, 7 and 8,  !F has an I-proof. Thus, if any one of the listed conditions
is true, then F ?;  !F must have an I-proof.
It only remains to be shown that, corresponding to each way of violating all the
conditions, there is a sequent that has a C-proof but whose augmented version does
not have an I-proof. Clearly, we need to consider only those situations in which a 8-R
rule is used in the C-proof. Now, our analysis breaks up into two parts, depending on
whether or not a -R rule appears in the C-proof. Suppose, rst, that it does not. Then
the C-proof must contain occurrences of both an _-L and a 8-L rule and of one of the
-L, _-R and 9-R rules. The following sequents have C-proofs respectively meeting
each of these requirements:
8x 8y (p(x) _ q(y)); (8x p(x))(8y q(y))!8y q(y);
8x 8y (p(x) _ q(y))! (8x p(x)) _ (8y q(y));
8x 8y (r(x; a) _ r(y; b))!9y 8x r(x; y):
We assume that p and q are unary predicate symbols, that r is a binary predicate
symbol and that a and b are constants in these sequents. Now, denoting the antecedent
by   and the formula in the succedent by F in each case, it can be seen that in none
of these cases does F ?;  !F have an I-proof.
To complete the argument, we consider the situation in which an -R rule appears
in the C-proof. In this case, one of the -L, _-R and 9-R must also appear in the
C-proof. But then consider the following sequents:
8x ((p(x)?)?)!8x p(x);
!8x (p(x) _ (p(x) s)); and
!9y 8x (p(y)p(x)):
In these sequents, we assume additionally that s is a proposition symbol. Now,
these sequents have C-proofs respectively meeting each of the requirements. How-
ever, it can be easily seen that none of the augmented versions of these sequents have
an I-proof.
It remains only to characterize the situations in which the augmentation suces to
reduce intuitionistic provability to uniform provability. Part of this task has already
been performed in [17]. In particular, it has been shown there that if G?;  !G
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has an I-proof in which no 8-R rule is used, then this sequent also has an O-proof. In
determining the other situations in which a similar property holds, we nd it convenient
to use a modied version of our calculus for constructing I-proofs. Towards this end, we
consider the following inference rules that are parameterized by a specic formula G:
B; !F D; !G _-LGB _ D;!F
!G resG!F
We assume that B, D and F are schema variables for formulas in these rules and that
 denotes a multiset of formulas. These rules are obviously derived ones relative to
the calculus for constructing I-proofs in the case that  contains the formula G?.
Moreover, every use that is made of the \additional" formula G? in an I-proof
of G?;  !G can actually be transformed into a use of a resG rule. Thus, in
constructing an I-proof of a sequent of the form G?;  !G, we may use these
rules and also make the augmentation of the antecedent implicit by strengthening the
proviso on the 9-L and 8-R rules to disallow the use of constants appearing in G. We
are actually interested in a calculus that results from the above modications and the
removal of the _-L rule. Let us refer to derivations constructed within this calculus as
IG-proofs. We then have the following observation.
Lemma 13. Let the sequent G?;  !G have an I-proof in which no 8-L or -R
rules are used. Then there is an IG-proof for  !G in which no 8-L and -R rules
are used.
Proof. By an I0G-proof, let us mean a derivation that does not contain any 8-L or
-R rules and that would be an IG-proof except for the fact that some number of
_-L rules appear in it. From the premises of the lemma, it follows that  !G has
an I0G-proof. Thus, it suces to show that an I
0
G-proof of  !G with some _-L rules
in it can be transformed into one that does not contain any _-L rules. We do this by
an inductive argument based on the number of _-L rules in the given I0G-proof. We
shall assume in this argument that this derivation satises two additional properties:
(a) the antecedent(s) of the upper sequent(s) of each left operational rule contains
(contain) an occurrence of the principal formula of that rule and (b) each 9-L and
8-R rule uses a distinct constant all of whose occurrences are restricted to the part
of the derivation appearing above that rule. We may have to introduce some contr-L
rules into the original derivation to make sure that the rst requirement is satised
and a consistent renaming of some constants suces to ensure the second property.
These ‘preprocessing’ steps may be applied with impunity since they do not increase
the number of _-L rules in the derivation and they also produce something that is
itself an I0G-proof of the same nal sequent.
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An explicit argument is needed only in the case that at least one _-L rule appears
somewhere in the derivation. Suppose this happens to be of the form
B; !F D; !F
B _ D;!F
We may replace this with an _-LG rule, thereby reducing the number of occurrences
of _-L rules, provided we can produce an IG-proof for D;!G. It suces, for this
purpose, to exhibit an I0G-proof for D;!G with fewer _-L rules in it than in the
given derivation for  !G. Such a derivation can be constructed based on the one for
 !G by retaining unchanged the portion of the latter derivation above the sequent
D;!F and by transforming the portion below this sequent as follows:
1. Replacing all left rules that are not _-LG rules above whose right upper sequent
D;!F appears by the sequent D;!F 0 where F 0 is the succedent of the upper
and lower sequents of this rule; applications of this transformation to a sequence of
such rules will result in replacement by a single sequent.
2. Erasing the portion of the derivation up to and including the left upper sequent of
all remaining _-LG rules and renaming these to resG rules.
3. Replacing each right rule with an instance of the same schema but with D; as the
antecedent of the upper and lower sequents.
4. Replacing the derivation above the upper sequent of an ^-R rule that is dierent
from the one above which the sequent D;!F appears by one that uses the same
rule schemata but with suitably modied antecedents.
Clearly, this construction eliminates at least one _-L rule from the given I0G-proof.
However, some care is needed in ascertaining that it yields something that is indeed
an I0G-proof. First, each 8-R rule below D;!F in the new ‘derivation’ uses the
same constant as is used in the derivation of  !G and we must verify that this is
acceptable. We see this to be the case by observing that this constant cannot appear
in D; since the given derivation does not contain occurrences of either the 8-L or
the -R rules. Second, it must be possible to construct the derivation above the other
upper sequent of an ^-R rule as described; in particular, all the 8-R and left rules
needed in this construction must be legitimate ones. Our assumptions concerning the
constants used in 9-L and 8-R rules and the relationship between the antecedents of
the upper and lower sequents of each left operational rule in the given I0G-proof ensure
that this is the case.
We now relativize the notion of a uniform proof to our modied calculus. In par-
ticular, let an OG-proof be an IG-proof with the following characteristic: if there is a
sequent in this proof whose succedent contains a non-atomic formula, then that sequent
occurs as the lower sequent of an inference rule that introduces the top-level logical
symbol of that formula. The following may then be observed:
Lemma 14. If  !G has a IG-proof in which no 8-L or -R rules appear; then it
has an OG-proof.
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Proof. By the nonuniformity measure of a left rule in an IG-proof let us mean the
count of right rules pertaining to logical symbols in the succedent of the lower sequent
of the left rule that appear above the left rule in the derivation. Further, let the nonuni-
formity measure of the IG-proof itself be dened to be the sum of the nonuniformity
measures of the left operational rules contained in it. Now, let us refer to an IG-proof
in which no 8-L or -R rules appear as an I0G-proof. We claim then that if  !G has
an I0G-proof, then it has one whose nonuniformity measure is 0. We prove this claim by
induction on the measure. We shall assume in our argument that the given derivation
satises two additional properties: (a) the antecedent(s) of the upper sequent(s) of each
left operational rule contains (contain) an occurrence of the principal formula of that
rule and (b) each 9-L and 8-R rule uses a distinct constant all of whose occurrences
are restricted to the part of the derivation appearing above that rule. We may have to
apply the preprocessing steps discussed in the proof of Lemma 13 to ensure that these
requirements are met, but we can do this without changing the nonuniformity measure
of the derivation.
In order to establish the claim, it is sucient to show that if  !G has an I0G-proof
with nonzero nonuniformity measure, then it has one with a smaller such measure. From
the assumption it follows that the given derivation contains a left operational rule with
right operational rules pertaining to the succedent of its lower sequent appearing above
it. We focus on a left rule that is the rst along some path in the derivation to have
this characteristic. It is easily seen that a contr-L rule can be moved above any right
rule in an IG-proof. Thus, we may assume that the left operational rule of interest
appears immediately after the relevant right rule in the given I0G-proof. Our objective,
now, is to show that these two rules can be reordered in a way that decreases the
nonuniformity measure of the overall derivation.
A simple transformation can be used to achieve this eect when the left rule is not
a 9-L or the right rule is not a 9-R. We illustrate this by considering one particular
case: that when the left rule is an -L and the right rule is an ^-R. In this case, the
subderivation at the end has the following structure:
!B
D; !F1 D;!F2 ^-RD;!F1 ^ F2 -LBD;!F1 ^ F2
By assumption, the nonuniformity measure of the derivation of !B is 0. We may
reuse the I0G-proofs of !B, D;!F1 and D;!F2 to produce an alternative sub-
derivation of BD;!F1 ^ F2 that has the structure
!B D; !F1 -LBD;!F1
!B D; !F2 -LBD;!F2 ^-RBD;!F1 ^ F2
at the end. The nonuniformity measure of the new subderivation is obviously less than
that of the earlier one, and it also does not have any new occurrences of right rules
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that could increase the nonuniformity measure of left operational rules appearing later
in the derivation. Thus, the desired eect is achieved by this transformation.
For the only remaining case, let us suppose that it occurs in a subderivation that has
the structure
[c=x]B; ! [t=y]D 9-R[c=x]B; !9yD 9-L9x B; !9yD
at the end. Now, it can be shown that [c=x]B; !G has an I0G-proof of smaller nonuni-
formity measure than that of the one for  !G; as in the proof of Lemma 13, we
construct such a derivation essentially by mimicking the structure of the given I0G-proof
of  !G and note that at least one occurrence of a 9-L rule { the one shown above
{ that makes a nonzero contribution to the nonuniformity measure is eliminated in
the process. From the induction hypothesis, it follows then that [c=x]B; !G has an
I0G-proof of zero nonuniformity measure. The proviso on a 9-L rule ensures that c does
not occur in B,  or G. Given this, we may also assume that c does not also appear
in t, for, if it does, we simply rename it to a new constant c0 that satises this addi-
tional requirement and use [c0=x]B; !G and its corresponding derivation in the rest
of the argument. Using the known derivation for [c=x]B; !G, we may restructure
the I0G-proof for 9x B; !9yD so that it has the form
[c=x]B; !G resG[c=x]B; ! [t=y]D 9-L9x B; ! [t=y]D 9-R9x B; !9yD
at the end. This derivation obviously has a nonuniformity measure less than that of
the earlier one and using it instead also decreases the nonuniformity measure of the
overall derivation.
We have thus shown that  !G has an I0G-proof, and, hence, an IG-proof, of zero
nonuniformity measure. By moving contr-L rules above any immediately preceding
right rules in this derivation, we obtain a structure that would be an OG-proof if
an additional property holds: the succedent of the lower sequent of every ?-R and
resG rule is an atomic formula. This may not be true at the outset, but a simple
transformation process ensures that it eventually is. To illustrate this process, suppose
that there is a resG rule in the derivation whose lower sequent has the formula F1^F2
as its succedent. Now, there must be a last sequent following this one in the derivation
that has the same formula as its succedent. Suppose this sequent is !F1 ^ F2. By
imitating the derivation of this sequent, we obtain IG-proofs for !F1 and !F2.
Further, using these IG-proofs, we may replace the derivation of !F1 ^ F2 by one
that has the structure
!F1 !F2 ^-R!F1 ^ F2
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at the end without changing the nonuniformity measure of the overall IG-proof. The
virtue of this transformation is that the resG rule in the original derivation is replaced by
ones whose lower sequent have formulas with fewer logical symbols in their succedents.
In a more detailed presentation, we associate with each IG-proof of zero nonuniformity
measure a multiset of numbers that count the logical symbols in the formulas that
appear as the succedents of the lower sequents of ?-R and resG rules used in the
derivation. We then use the above form of argument in an induction over the multiset
ordering induced by the usual ordering on natural numbers [1] to show that  !G has
an IG-proof of zero nonuniformity measure and in which the succedent of the lower
sequent of every ?-R and resG rule is atomic.
The following theorem states the desired relationship between intuitionistic and uni-
form provability.
Theorem 15. Suppose that there is an I-proof for a sequent of the form G?;  !G
satisfying one of the following restrictions on rule usage:
1. No 8-R rule is used.
2. No _-R or no _-L rule is used and; in addition; either no 9-R rule is used or no
_-L and 9-L rules are used.
3. no 8-L and -R rules are used.
Then there is an O-proof for the same sequent. Furthermore; this characterization is
complete in the following sense: there is a sequent of the required form that has an
I-proof but no O-proof corresponding to each way of violating all the restrictions on
inference rule usage.
Proof. The suciency of the rst restriction on inference rule usage is shown in [17]
and that of the second restriction follows immediately from Theorem 10. The suciency
of the third restriction is a consequence of Lemmas 13 and 14 and the observation that
an OG-proof for  !G can be translated into a uniform proof for G?;  !G.
We now show the completeness of the characterization in the sense claimed. To
begin with, the only situations we need to consider are those in which a 8-R rule is
used in the I-proof. Now, we may partition these situations based on whether an _-R
or a 9-R rule has been used. Considering the former possibility rst, we note that in
these situations an _-L rule and one of the 8-L and -R rules must also have been
used. The following sequents have I-proofs respectively satisfying these requirements
on rule usage:
(8y (r(b; y) _ r(a; y)))?; 8y (r(a; y) _ r(b; y))!8y (r(b; y) _ r(a; y)); and
(8y ((r(b; y) _ r(a; y))(r(a; y) _ r(b; y))))? !
8y ((r(b; y) _ r(a; y))(r(a; y) _ r(b; y)));
we assume that r is a binary predicate symbol and a and b are constants in these
sequents. It is easily seen that neither of these sequents has an O-proof, as is required.
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To nish the proof, we have to consider those situations in which the violation
of the restrictions arises from the use of a 9-R rule. In these cases, one of the _-L
and 9-L rules and also one of the 8-L and -R rules must also have been used. We
list four sequents of the required form that have I-proofs respectively satisfying these
requirements:
(8y 9x r(x; y))?; 8y (r(a; y) _ r(b; y))!8y 9x r(x; y);
(8y ((r(a; y) _ r(b; y))9x r(x; y)))?!8y ((r(a; y) _ r(b; y))9x r(x; y));
(8y 9x r(x; y))?; 8y 9x r(x; y)!8y 9x r(x; y); and
(8y ((9x r(x; y))9x r(x; y)))?!8y ((9x r(x; y))9x r(x; y)):
Once again, it can be veried that none of these sequents has an O-proof.
Combining Theorems 12 and 15, we see that if  !G has a C-proof satisfying
one of the following restrictions on rule usage, then there must also be an O-proof
for G?;  !G: (i) no 8-R rule is used, (ii) no -L, _-R and 9-R rule is used,
and (iii) no -R and 8-L rule is used. These restrictions can be recast in an obvious
manner into ones on the syntax of formulas in the sequent for which a derivation is
to be constructed and are, in fact, more useful in this form. Of all these conditions,
the one that is most easily ensured in practice is that there be no universal quantiers
occurring negatively in the antecedent and positively in the succedent { any sequent can
be transformed in one that is equivalent from the perspective of classical provability
and that satises this additional property through the use of Herbrand functions [22].
A proof procedure based on these observations is described in [17] and connections
with other previously presented procedures is also discussed there.
We observe, nally, that the results of this section are also relevant from the perspec-
tive of structuring proof search in intuitionistic logic. In particular, the augmentation
of sequents is sound with respect to intuitionistic provability whenever the structure
of the sequent ensures a coincidence with classical provability. Such an augmentation
may then be used to obtain a reduction to uniform provability. One interesting situation
in which this approach may be utilized is that when implications and universal quan-
tications do not appear positively in the succedent and negatively in the antecedent
of a sequent. This situation epitomizes disjunctive logic programming and is discussed
in more detail in [18].
6. Conclusion
We have explored the interrelationships between the notions of classical, intuitionistic
and uniform provability in this paper. We have also examined the relevance of our
results to proof search in classical and intuitionistic logic and to identifying logic
programming languages. We believe there are other applications to our observations
as well, especially to our characterization of the correspondence between classical and
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intuitionistic provability. Another matter that is only partially studied here and that is
worthy of further consideration is the usefulness of uniform provability in designing
proof procedures for intuitionistic logic.
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